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INTRODUCTION 
Since its inception, the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA)1 
has been a divisive piece of legislation.2 Generally, it made several 
important changes to the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)3 and, 
in so doing, outlined a series of “unfair labor practices” that would be 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 171-89 (2006) (also commonly known as the 
“Taft-Hartley Act”). 
 2. In fact, the 80th Congress, then under a Republican majority, overrode a veto by Democratic 
President Harry Truman to make the LMRA law. HARRY A. MILLIS & EMILY CLARK BROWN, FROM THE 
WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-HARTLEY: A STUDY OF NATIONAL LABOR POLICY AND LABOR RELATIONS 389–
92 (1950). Its reforms to American labor law at the time were sweeping and quite significant. See Mark 
Gruenberg, Taft-Hartley Signed 60 Years Ago, POL. AFF. (June 13, 2007, 9:11 AM), http://www.political 
affairs.net/taft-hartley-signed-60-years-ago (“On June 23, 1947, U.S. labor law turned upside down.”). 
 3. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2006) (also commonly known as the “Wagner 
Act”); Arthur L. Stern, Annotation, The Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 1947, and its 
Effect on the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, 173 A.L.R. 1401, 1402–03 (1948). 
2
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forbidden to unions.4 Section 302 of LMRA makes it unlawful for 
“any employer . . . to pay, lend, or deliver, any money or other thing 
of value . . . to any labor organization, or any officer or employee 
thereof, which represents, seeks to represent, or would admit to 
membership, any of the employees of such employer . . . .”5 Congress 
passed Section 302 with a predominant objective in mind—to prevent 
employers from compromising union officials’ loyalty and union 
officials from unduly wresting financial concessions from employers.6 
Over the past sixty-five years, courts have been tasked with 
interpreting this broad language to identify what constitutes a “thing 
of value” within the meaning of Section 302 in an extremely wide 
variety of circumstances.7 In recent decades, this issue has surfaced in 
several United States Courts of Appeal challenging the validity of 
                                                                                                                 
 4. R. ALTON LEE, EISENHOWER & LANDRUM-GRIFFIN: A STUDY IN LABOR-MANAGEMENT POLITICS 
6 (1990) (noting that LMRA was “[b]ased on the premise that the national government should be an 
impartial referee rather than a union supporter in labor-management conflict”); see also Arroyo v. United 
States, 359 U.S. 419, 425 (1959) (averring that LMRA “was aimed at practices which Congress considered 
inimical to the integrity of the collective bargaining process”). For further background and discussion 
pertaining to each of the unfair labor practices outlined in LMRA, see MILLIS & BROWN, supra note 2, at 
420–81 and discussion infra Part I.A. 
 5. 29 U.S.C. § 186(a)(2); United States v. Douglas, 634 F.3d 852, 857 (6th Cir. 2011). Additionally, 
Section 302 makes it unlawful for anyone to “request, demand, receive, or accept . . . any payment, loan, 
or delivery of any money or other thing of value prohibited by subsection (a) of this section.” 29 U.S.C. 
§ 186(b)(1); Douglas, 634 F.3d at 857. 
 6. Adcock v. Freightliner LLC, 550 F.3d 369, 375 (4th Cir. 2008) (“The Supreme Court has noted 
that [Section] 302 was enacted to curb abuses that Congress felt were ‘inimical to the integrity of the 
collective bargaining process.’” (quoting Arroyo, 359 U.S. at 425)); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Int’l Union, UAW, 
107 F.3d 1052, 1057 (3d Cir. 1997) (“Section 302 of that statute was passed to address bribery, extortion 
and other corrupt practices conducted in secret.”); Turner v. Local Union No. 302, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 
604 F.2d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing Alvares v. Erickson, 514 F.2d 156, 164 (9th Cir. 1975)); Bill 
Lurye, Section 302: The LMRA’s Criminal Cousin, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/ 
aba/administrative/labor_law/meetings/2011/ac2011/073.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2013) (prefacing that 
Section 302 was “[e]nacted for the purpose of preventing corruption and disloyalty in labor-management 
relations”). Specifically to this point, Congress “[forbade] the delivery to any such [union] official of that 
which might ‘turn the edge of his allegiance.’” United States v. Roth, 333 F.2d 450, 453 (2d Cir. 1964) 
(quoting United States v. Ryan, 225 F.2d 417, 426 (2d Cir. 1955)). 
 7. See United States v. Overton, 470 F.2d 761, 764–66 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding the purchasing of 
products from clients of a public relations corporation incorporated by union officials constituted a thing 
of value); United States v. Ferrara, 458 F.2d 868, 873 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding a restaurateur’s employer’s 
agreement to switch coffee suppliers constituted a thing of value). But see Zentner v. Am. Fed’n of 
Musicians, 237 F. Supp. 457, 463 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 343 F.2d 758 (2d Cir. 1965) (per curiam) (holding a 
list of employees’ names and addresses did not constitute a thing of value). For an exhaustive list of things 
that courts have held do and do not constitute a “thing of value” within the meaning of Section 302 of 
LMRA, see James Achermann, Small Gifts and Big Trouble: Clarifying the Taft-Hartley Act, 44 U.S.F. 
L. REV. 63, 88–90 (2009). 
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certain employer-union organizing agreements, specifically those that 
provide for organizing assistance from an employer to a union.8 Courts 
tasked with determining whether these provisions constitute a “thing 
of value” to unions in violation of Section 302 of LMRA have 
followed varying rationales and reached different conclusions.9 
Recently, in Mulhall v. Unite Here Local 355, an Eleventh Circuit 
panel interpreted “thing of value” in an illuminating but controversial 
way: it held that a neutrality agreement between an employer and a 
union that provided for organizing assistance from an employer to a 
union could constitute a “thing of value” in violation of Section 302 of 
the LMRA. 10  This decision poses significant ramifications for 
employers and unions operating within the Eleventh Circuit’s 
jurisdiction.11 On the whole, it “potentially undermines the ability of 
an employer and a union to contract without risking a legal challenge 
from an individual employee,” who simply may not wish to work at a 
                                                                                                                 
 8. See generally Adcock, 550 F.3d 369; Hotel Emps. Union, Local 57 v. Sage Hospitality Res., LLC, 
390 F.3d 206 (3d Cir. 2004); Roth, 333 F.2d 450. Generally, these agreements provide for employer 
neutrality to potential unionization and are “contract[s] between a union and an employer under which the 
employer agrees to support a union’s attempt to organize its workforce.” What is a “Neutrality 
Agreement” and How Does it Affect Workers?, NAT’L RIGHT TO WORK LEGAL DEF. FOUND., 
http://www.nrtw.org/neutrality/na_1.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2013). The majority of these agreements 
also involve “recognition of a union on the basis of a card check or other alternative recognition process, 
and avoidance of the National Labor Relations Board election and litigation process.” Kurt G. Larkin, 
Section 302: Drawing the Line for Employers, Unions, LAW360 (July 31, 2012, 2:38 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/358507/section-302-drawing-the-line-for-employers-unions. 
 9. Compare Roth, 333 F.2d at 454, with Adcock, 550 F.3d at 375, and Sage Hospitality, 390 F.3d at 
219. Defined broadly, “organizing assistance” refers to “intangible services, privileges, or concessions” 
on the part of an employer that a union may accept in exchange for other “bargaining concessions.” 
Mulhall v. Unite Here Local 355, 667 F.3d 1211, 1215 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. dismissed, 134 S. Ct. 594, 
and cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 822 (2013); Mark A. Carter & Shawn P. Burton, The Criminal Element of 
Neutrality Agreements, 25 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 173, 180 (2007). For a brief discussion of the 
holdings and rationales of these cases, see discussion infra Part II.C. 
 10. Mulhall, 667 F.3d at 1215–16. 
 11. For instance, Mulhall weakens “the confidence with which unions and employers contract in 
neutrality agreements . . . because employees have standing to challenge the agreements.” Patrick L. 
Coyle & Alexandra V. Garrison, Labor and Employment, 62 MERCER L. REV. 1199, 1211 (2011). In fact, 
the Eleventh Circuit confirmed Mulhall’s (the plaintiff-employee) standing to sue in a previous appeal. 
Mulhall v. Unite Here Local 355, 618 F.3d 1279, 1288 (11th Cir. 2010). Such a framework threatens to 
undermine an otherwise stable employer-union relationship. See Jonah J. Lalas, Taking the Fear Out of 
Organizing: Dana II and Union Neutrality Agreements, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 541, 547 (2011) 
(noting that these agreements “help lead to ‘industrial peace’ between the parties by removing the coercive 
nature of management activity in N.L.R.B. election processes and promoting greater employee free 
choice”); Larkin, supra note 8 (noting that these agreements “facilitate successful union organizing 
without the use of secret ballot voting”). 
4
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place where employees are unionized, regardless of whether the 
individual employee opts out of representation.12 Neither an employer 
nor a union may wish to risk the threat of a lawsuit to enjoin the 
agreements and penalties, as a Section 302 violation is an enumerated 
predicate “racketeering” activity in the RICO statute.13 
Part I of this Note traces the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act and 
briefly chronicles the rise in the use of neutrality agreements.14 Part I 
also addresses both sides of federal jurisprudence in the interpretation 
of what constitutes a “thing of value” within the meaning of Section 
302 of LMRA, in the context of both employer-union organizing 
assistance and neutrality agreements. 15  The development of this 
statutory inclusion, as well as recent judicial interpretation of this 
phrase, provides enormous insight into the Eleventh Circuit’s recent 
decision, discussed in more detail in Part II.16 However, the rationale 
behind this decision has arguably imputed some sort of “intent 
requirement” into the statute, unsupported by its language and 
                                                                                                                 
 12. Coyle & Garrison, supra note 11, at 1206. An employee who does not want to be a part of a 
unionized workforce for any number of reasons may sue to enjoin the agreement. Id. As a consequence, 
both employers and unions may pay the price by “forego[ing] entering into such arrangements entirely, 
even when to do so would be beneficial and entirely legal.” Dan Bushell, 11th Circuit Elevates Individual 
Circumstances Over Categorical Rules in Assessing Union-Employer Cooperation Agreements, FLA. 
APP. REV. (Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.floridaappellatereview.com/general-civil-litigation/playing-too-
nicely-11th-circuit-says-union-employer-cooperation-agreement-may-violate-lmra (emphasis added). 
 13. Adcock, 550 F.3d at 373 n.2 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1961(c) (2006)). Generally, the RICO statute can 
be summarized as follows: 
The Act provides for criminal and/or civil remedies when a person or enterprise engages 
in a pattern of racketeering activity for the purpose of: using the income from racketeering 
activity to acquire an interest in an enterprise; obtaining an interest in an enterprise by 
means of racketeering activity; participating in the operation of an enterprise through a 
pattern of racketeering activity; or conspiring to commit any of the above. 
Raymond P. Green, The Application of RICO to Labor-Management and Employment Disputes, 7 ST. 
THOMAS L. REV. 309, 310 (1995). Additionally, Green notes that “[a] large area of ambiguity exists when 
applying RICO to labor disputes . . . in terms of . . . what types of activities constitute patterns of 
racketeering acts.” Id. at 312. In his article, James Brudney notes that “[w]hen RICO was drafted and 
enacted, Congress did not anticipate its widespread injection into routine business controversies or 
traditional labor-management relations.” James J. Brudney, Collateral Conflict: Employer Claims of 
RICO Extortion Against Union Comprehensive Campaigns, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 731, 734 (2010). 
 14. See discussion infra Part I.A–B. 
 15. See discussion infra Part I.C. 
 16. The Mulhall court made its decision largely based on its interpretation of congressional inclusion 
of similar broad language throughout other criminal statutes, as well as on the court’s so-called “common 
sense.” Mulhall, 667 F.3d at 1214–15; see also discussion infra Part II.A.1. 
5
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legislative history.17 It also does not serve the comprehensive judicial 
interest in “line-drawing and predictability” in statutory 
interpretation.18 After an analysis of arguments of both sides of this 
issue, Part III proposes that classifying these agreements as “things of 
value” does not serve Congress’s purpose in enacting the statute, and 
that opposing policy considerations can be reconciled without 
following such a classification. Part III also highlights a potentially 
unworkable framework for interpreting all organizing agreements, past 
and future.19 
I.   SETTING THE STAGE FOR NEUTRALITY AGREEMENTS IN AMERICAN 
LABOR PRACTICE 
A.   Unfair Labor Practices Under Taft-Hartley 
The Taft-Hartley Act came about as a result of almost immediate 
dissatisfactions with the previously-passed Wagner Act.20 Generally, 
three major points underscore the arguments that changes to federal 
labor law were still warranted.21 First, organized labor had achieved a 
dominant power in industry, necessitating a balancing of organized 
labor’s collective position with that of employers and individual 
employees.22 Second, unions had not necessarily developed a “sense 
of responsibility to industry and the public, or to individual employees 
and union members, correlative to their protected rights.”23  Third, 
labor organizations were not subject to the same or equivalent 
limitations and responsibilities as were employers.24 In response to 
                                                                                                                 
 17. See Larkin, supra note 8. 
 18. See Bushell, supra note 12; discussion infra Part II.B. 
 19. See Larkin, supra note 8 (“Such a result would imply that virtually all organizing rights agreements 
are ‘illegal’ under Section 302. This cannot be the case, as the number of federal courts upholding 
voluntary organizing agreements under Section 301 of the LMRA are legion.”); discussion infra Part III. 
 20. In the ten-year period from 1936 to 1946 following the passage of the Wagner Act, 169 bills 
relating to national labor policy were introduced in Congress, on top of sixty-one bills introduced before 
the 80th Congress (the Congress that passed the Taft-Hartley Act) and fifty other such legislative 
proposals. MILLIS & BROWN, supra note 2, at 333. Unfair labor practices made up one of seven general 
areas that appeared to need further legislation and regulation. Id. at 336. 
 21. Id. at 272. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
6
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these widespread concerns, the Taft-Hartley Act added special 
prohibitions specifically aimed at preventing unfair labor practices and 
also applied the prohibitions to both union and employee conduct.25 
As it stands, however, LMRA expressly provides certain exceptions 
to Section 302’s prohibition on an employer giving any “thing of 
value” to a union or its representatives. 26  An employer may only 
contribute financially to a union’s operating account by deducting 
union dues from employee wages with express written consent from 
union representatives.27 
LMRA’s prohibition on monetary transfers from employers to 
unions has not been an overly complex and problematic issue for 
parties, courts, and commenters to reckon with.28 Similar “intangible” 
benefits have proven more difficult to evaluate, however, as a “thing 
of value” within the meaning of Section 302.29 Several United States 
                                                                                                                 
 25. Id. at 336–37. Generally, these unfair labor practices fall into five categories: (1) free speech and 
interference with the rights of employees; (2) company dominated unions; (3) discrimination and union-
security provisions; (4) restraint or coercion by unions; and (5) collective bargaining, refusal to bargain, 
and dispute settlement. Id. at 420–71. The prohibition on employers providing any “thing of value” to a 
union falls within category two. Id. Its aim is to prevent “assistance or support of a labor organization by 
an employer that interferes with the organization’s ability to function as an independent representative of 
employee interests.” STEPHEN I. SCHLOSSBERG & JUDITH A. SCOTT, ORGANIZING AND THE LAW 83 (4th 
ed. 1991). 
 26. Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(1)–(5) (2006). Notably, this code section is 
titled “Restrictions on financial transactions.” Id. § 186. Specified exceptions include the payment of dues 
collected under a check off system (the automatic deduction of union dues from employees’ paychecks) 
and the payment of contributions to certain welfare or trust funds for the benefit of employees. Blassie v. 
Kroger Co., 345 F.2d 58, 68–69 (8th Cir. 1965) (also noting that the court “prefer[red] to approach [its] 
present task with a construction policy favoring inclusion and benefits where there is no positive statutory 
language or inference of exclusion, rather than one favoring exclusion and a denial of benefits where there 
is no positive language of inclusion”); Local No. 2 of Operative Plasterers Int’l Ass’n v. Paramount 
Plastering, Inc., 310 F.2d 179, 182–83 (9th Cir. 1962). Congress provided these exceptions for certain 
special funds derived from employer contributions “to limit the type of funds which could be jointly 
administered” by labor and management. Id. 
 27. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(4); Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 326 F.2d 916, 920 (2d 
Cir. 1964) (reading Section 302(c)(4) of LMRA as the “exclusive method by which employers may 
contribute to the general purpose funds of unions”); CONG. OF INDUS. ORGS., ANALYSIS OF THE TAFT-
HARTLEY ACT 12 (1947) (“[I]f an employer receives an assignment from a man to check off initiation 
fees there is no violation of the Taft-Hartley Act involved.”). 
 28. MILLIS & BROWN, supra note 2, at 428 (relating that Section 302(a) “largely concerned ‘trust 
funds’ or ‘welfare funds’ . . . [and] there can be little doubt that the words applied also to financial 
contributions in connection with aid to a company union” given the severe penalties imposed for 
violation). 
 29. “Countless hypothetical cases can be put, each on its facts approaching that evanescent borderline 
between the proper and the improper. No calculating machine has yet been invented to make these 
determinations with certainty.” United States v. Roth, 333 F.2d 450, 454 (2d Cir. 1964). “In the meantime 
7
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Court of Appeals cases have addressed forms of intangible benefits 
between employers and unions, including “benefits” in the form of 
organizing assistance in employer-union neutrality agreements. 30 
Given the lack of statutory and regulatory guidance on “things of 
value” (with reference to intangible benefits), 31  these courts have 
undertaken varying analyses, reached different conclusions, and set 
forth competing standards.32 
B.   The Rise of Neutrality Agreements and Current National and 
Local Union Membership 
Typically, non-unionized employees initiate the unionization 
process by contacting a local union. 33  Once a majority of the 
employees at an establishment have designated a particular union as 
their authorized bargaining representative, the union “ordinarily will 
request that the employer recognize the union and enter into a 
collective bargaining relationship.”34 At this point, the employer can 
simply grant this request, but more often than not, it declines in favor 
of exercising its right to demand a representation election.35 During the 
                                                                                                                 
the courts must rely upon the less mechanical judgment and common sense which under the present system 
is, and of necessity must be, lodged in judges and juries.” Id.; W. J. Dunn, Annotation, Section 302(a)–
(d) of Labor Management Relations Act (29 USC § 186(a)–(d)) Concerning Payments Between an 
Employer and a Representative of His Employees, 13 A.L.R.3D 569, 575 (1967) (“Somewhat more 
diffculty [sic] has been encountered when the transaction does not involve the direct transfer of money 
from an employer to a representative of his employees . . . .”). 
 30. See generally Adcock v. Freightliner LLC, 550 F.3d 369 (4th Cir. 2008); Hotel Emps. Union, 
Local 57 v. Sage Hospitality Res., LLC, 390 F.3d 206 (3d Cir. 2004); Roth, 333 F.2d 450. Neutrality 
agreements had become more popular since the 1970s. Matthew T. Bodie, Information and the Market 
for Union Representation, 94 VA. L. REV. 1, 73 (2008) (noting the increase in popularity of neutrality 
agreements (citing James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition: Prospects for 
Changing Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REV. 819, 824, 828–30 (2005))). For a discussion of the rise of 
neutrality agreements, see infra Part I.B. 
 31. See Achermann, supra note 7, at 63 (“[The statute’s] provisions are overly expansive and vague. 
The plain language of the statute is extremely broad, using convoluted and ambiguous terminology.”). 
 32. See discussion infra Part I.C.1–2. 
 33. James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition: Prospects for Changing 
Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REV. 819, 824 (2005). Brudney also notes that such employees may “for any 
number of reasons feel unfairly treated in their work environment.” Id.; see also National Labor Relations 
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (2006); BENJAMIN WERNE, THE LAW OF LABOR RELATIONS 3 (1951). 
 34. Brudney, supra note 33, at 824. 
 35. Id. at 824–25 (noting that exercising this right gives the employer the opportunity to urge its 
employees “to vote against unionization; the election is thus a contest challenging the union’s assertion 
that it enjoys majority support”); see also Charles I. Cohen, Joseph E. Santucci, Jr. & Jonathan C. Fritts, 
8
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so-called campaign period, employers give employees the 
management perspective of employees’ union rights and the potential 
ramifications for agreeing to union representation.36 
Beginning in the late 1970s, in response to a sharp decline in 
national union membership,37 unions began working with employers 
to modify the traditional organizing approach by agreeing that the 
employer would remain neutral with regard to organizing efforts.38 By 
the late 1990s, unions bargained for neutrality much more frequently, 
and these agreements became “a central component of the labor 
movement’s organizing strategy.” 39  Today, both employers and 
unions enter into neutrality agreements for a wide variety of strategic 
reasons.40 
                                                                                                                 
Resisting its Own Obsolescence—How the National Labor Relations Board is Questioning the Existing 
Law of Neutrality Agreements, 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 521, 524 (2006) (“A 
neutrality/card check agreement amounts to a waiver by the employer of its right to insist on an NLRB 
election as the basis for union recognition.”). 
 36. Zev J. Eigen & David Sherwyn, A Moral/Contractual Approach to Labor Law Reform, 63 
HASTINGS L.J. 695, 715 (2012). Many of the issues employers typically raise in this context include: 
Whether unions can “guarantee” increased pay, benefits, or anything else; [h]ow collective 
bargaining really works; [w]hat happens when strikes are called or picketing is conducted; 
[w]hat it costs to be a union member in terms of dues and initiation fees; where that money 
goes; how it is used, and by whom; [w]hether the union’s leaders are trustworthy and 
capable; [t]he employer’s record of responsiveness to employee issues; [t]he fact that 
employees will be paying someone to do what they may have been able to do (represent 
themselves) for free; [w]hether the organizing drive has actually been beneficial in the 
sense that it has called attention to problems that need to be addressed whether the union 
is there or not; and [w]hether the employer should make management changes (because an 
organizing drive seems to have been triggered by a perceived lack of leadership). 
Arch Stokes, Robert L. Murphy, Paul E. Wagner & David S. Sherwyn, Neutrality Agreements: How 
Unions Organize New Hotels Without an Employee Ballot, 42 CORNELL HOTEL & REST. ADMIN. Q., 
Oct.-Nov. 2001, at 86, 88–89. The most important limitation on an employer’s latitude in campaigning 
against unionization is that “informing employees of the consequences does not rise to the level of a 
threat.” Eigen & Sherwyn, supra 715 n.121 (citing Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) 
(2010)). 
 37. The “story of neutrality agreements” can be traced back to “unions’ frustrations in trying to 
counteract the decline in union density in the latter half of the twentieth century.” Laura J. Cooper, 
Privatizing Labor Law: Neutrality/Card Check Agreements and the Role of the Arbitrator, 83 IND. L.J. 
1589, 1591 (2008). In the mid-1970s, unionized workers represented but a quarter of the national 
workforce, down from its mid-1950s peak of one-third of the national workforce. Id.; see also Jonathan 
P. Hiatt & Lee W. Jackson, Union Survival Strategies for the Twenty-First Century, 12 LAB. LAW. 165, 
165 (1996) (“Forty years ago, one in three private sector workers belonged to a labor union; today the 
figure is closer to one in ten.”). 
 38. Brudney, supra note 33, at 825. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Adrienne Eaton and Jill Kriesky posit that: 
[B]oth employer and union strategies related to organizing fall into two “major classes,” 
9
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As of early 2012, unionized employees represent 11.8% of the 
national workforce.41 In the Eleventh Circuit, unionized employees 
represent 10.8% of Alabama’s workforce, 5.4% of Florida’s 
workforce, and 5.3% of Georgia’s workforce.42 Within these classes 
of employees, those that enjoy union representation under the auspices 
of a neutrality agreement may face uncertainty in the ultimate 
enforceability of those agreements in the wake of the Eleventh 
Circuit’s recent decision.43 
                                                                                                                 
internal and external. “External strategies” are those that seek to alter the context in which 
an organization operates. The American labor movement has recently begun to develop 
new, structurally oriented, internal strategies to deal with its organizing 
failures . . . . However, it has had a much longer, more sustained external strategy focused 
on shifting the context in which organizing takes place, specifically by neutralizing 
employer opposition. It has pursued two separate tracks in this regard, one legislative, the 
other contractual. 
Adrienne E. Eaton & Jill Kriesky, Union Organizing Under Neutrality and Card Check Agreements, 55 
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 42, 43 (2001) (emphasis added). Unions bargain for employer neutrality in lieu 
of the NLRB secret ballot election process largely because of increased success in organizing campaigns 
under these agreements. Brudney, supra note 33, at 832. On the whole, this increased success can largely 
be attributed to the removal of employer anti-union tactics from the equation. Id. (“Neutrality 
arrangements allow unions to avoid these effects—in particular to sidestep the intimidating consequences 
of employers’ anti-union speech or conduct and to minimize the eviscerating impact of lengthy delays 
under the Board’s legal regime.”). Moreover, employers agree to neutrality in part because of potential 
costs due to work stoppages and “picketing and handbilling aimed at deterring customers.” Id. at 836. 
Additionally, employers may agree to neutrality because of the possible marketing edge that it provides 
in attracting new business, the formation of union-management partnerships that “can more effectively 
extract benefits from government,” the ability to help attract more highly qualified workers, and the 
promotion of larger labor-management goals. Id. at 836–39. 
 41. News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members—2011, USDL-
12-0094 (Jan. 27, 2012), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/union2_01272012.pdf. 
 42. Barry T. Hirsch, David A. Macpherson & Wayne G. Vroman, Union Density Estimates by State, 
1964–2013, UNION MEMBERSHIP & COVERAGE DATABASE, http://unionstats.gsu.edu/MonthlyLabor 
ReviewArticle.htm (follow “State Union Membership Density, 1964–2013” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 
20, 2014). “Two sources of data are combined to produce the estimates: compilations from the Current 
Population Survey (CPS), a monthly survey of U.S. households, and the now discontinued BLS 
publication Directory of National Unions and Employee Associations (Directory), which contains 
information reported by labor unions to the Federal Government.” Barry T. Hirsch, David A. Macpherson 
& Wayne G. Vroman, Estimates of Union Density by State, 124 MONTHLY LAB. REV., July 2001, at 51, 
available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2001/07/ressum2.pdf. For a description of the methodology 
used to compile this data, see id. at 54. 
 43. See Larkin, supra note 8 (“Such a result would imply that virtually all organizing rights agreements 
are ‘illegal’ under Section 302.”). 
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C.   Judicial Interpretation of a “Thing of Value” 
1.   “Value” Set by Desire to Have the Thing 
In United States v. Roth, the vice president of a vending machine 
company, with the president’s approval, secured a $30,000 loan to the 
secretary-treasurer of the local union representing the employees.44 
The company argued that Congress’s 1959 amendment to the statute, 
which added the word “lend”, was meant to cure a “deficiency or 
loophole” in the former section, which was controlling at the time of 
the case. 45  The Second Circuit rejected this assertion and ruled 
adversely to the employer, finding that “[v]alue is usually set by the 
desire to have the ‘thing’ and depends upon the individual and the 
circumstances.”46 Disregarding the loan as the item at hand, the court 
read the broad nature of the statutory language as giving the “broadest 
possible scope” to the statute.47 This expansive interpretation seems to 
favor classifying intangible “things” as Section 302 “things of value.” 
2.   A Benefit to a Union Does Not Necessarily Constitute a “Thing 
of Value” 
In Hotel Employees Union, Local 57 v. Sage Hospitality Resources, 
LLC, the hotel development authority entered into a neutrality 
agreement with the local hotel and restaurant employees union.48 In 
the pertinent part, the agreement provided that whether or not the union 
would be recognized as the employees’ bargaining agent would be 
determined by using a “card check” procedure, and included a 
                                                                                                                 
 44. United States v. Roth, 333 F.2d 450, 452 (2d Cir. 1964). The local union secretary-treasurer repaid 
the loan in eight months. Id. 
 45. Id. at 453–54. While the Second Circuit ultimately decided Roth in 1964, the events that formed 
the basis for the plaintiff’s complaint occurred in 1957. Id. at 452. 
 46. Id. at 453. At trial, the jury was permitted to consider all surrounding circumstances as indicated 
by the evidence, and the court “made specific reference to such factors as the terms of the loan, interest, 
duration, collateral or absence thereof, [the secretary-treasurer]’s purpose in obtaining the loan, [and] the 
use to which he put the money.” Id. 
 47. Id. (citing United States v. Ryan, 350 U.S. 299, 300 (1956)). In a short dissenting opinion, Judge 
Hays simply stated that the statute “failed to prohibit loans with that clarity which is required of criminal 
statutes,” as demonstrated by the majority’s need to argue the issue extensively. Id. at 454 (Hays, J., 
dissenting). 
 48. Hotel Emps. Union, Local 57 v. Sage Hospitality Res., LLC, 390 F.3d 206, 209 (3d Cir. 2004). 
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provision requiring disputes to be settled by arbitration.49 Affirming 
the trial court’s order compelling arbitration of a dispute arising from 
card-count results, the Third Circuit held that the neutrality agreement 
presented no violation of LMRA Section 302 because it did not require 
the employer to provide anything of value to the union.50 It reasoned 
that the fact that the neutrality agreement, “like any other labor 
arbitration agreement[,] benefits both parties with efficiency and cost 
saving does not transform it into a payment or delivery of some 
benefit,” and that any inherent benefit the union may enjoy in more 
efficient dispute resolution did not constitute a “thing of value” within 
the meaning of the statute.51 
Furthermore, in Adcock v. Freightliner LLC, five trucking company 
employees, who did not want to be unionized, challenged agreements 
between the company and United Auto Workers (UAW) as a Section 
302 violation. 52  Under these contracts, the company agreed, in 
pertinent part, to do three things: (1) require some employees to attend 
union presentations explaining the Card Check Agreement; (2) provide 
the union with access to areas in company plants to allow union 
representatives to meet with employees; and (3) “refrain from making 
negative comments about the [u]nion during the organizing 
campaigns.”53 The Fourth Circuit read the plain language of Section 
302 to conclude that these concessions did not implicate the statutory 
meaning of “thing of value.”54 It characterized this reading of the 
statute as consistent with Congress’s purpose in enacting Section 302: 
“to curb abuses that Congress felt were ‘inimical to the integrity of the 
collective bargaining process.’” 55  In the court’s view, these 
concessions did not involve the company bribing or bestowing 
personal benefits on union officials, but instead served the interests of 
                                                                                                                 
 49. Id. at 209. The agreement also contained a “no-picketing promise.” Id. Under a typical “card 
check” provision of a neutrality agreement, the employer is required “to recognize the union if it obtains 
signatures on representation cards from a majority of employees.” Bodie, supra note 30, at 73. 
 50. Sage Hospitality, 390 F.3d at 219. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Adcock v. Freightliner LLC, 550 F.3d 369, 373 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 53. Id. at 374. 
 54. Id. (“Rather, all that is involved is the establishment of mutually acceptable ground rules . . . .”). 
 55. Id. at 375 (quoting Arroyo v. United States, 359 U.S. 419, 425 (1959)). 
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both parties. 56  Importantly, the Fourth Circuit commented that 
Congress “clearly intended § 302’s ‘thing of value’ to have at least 
some ascertainable value.”57 This rationale suggests those intangible 
benefits that objectively cannot be monetarily valued do not come 
within Section 302 of LMRA, a conclusion that forms a core issue with 
regard to this analysis. 
II.   THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ORGANIZING ASSISTANCE AND A 
SECTION 302 “THING OF VALUE” 
A.   Why Neutrality Agreements With Union Organizing Assistance 
Can Constitute a “Thing of Value” 
1.   The Eleventh Circuit, the Value of Intangibles, and “Common 
Sense” 
In Mulhall v. Unite Here Local 355, an employer and local union 
entered into an agreement under which the employer made three 
promises: “to (1) provide union representatives access to non-public 
work premises to organize employees during non-work hours; (2) 
provide the union a list of employees, their job classifications, 
departments, and addresses; and (3) remain neutral to the unionization 
of employees.”58 The employer, Hollywood Greyhound Track, Inc., 
provided Unite Here with information about its employees for 2006 
and 2007 (pursuant to the agreement), but refused to provide any more 
employee information in 2008. 59  After Hollywood ignored Unite 
Here’s request to arbitrate the dispute over employee information, 
                                                                                                                 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Mulhall v. Unite Here Local 355, 667 F.3d 1211, 1213 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. dismissed, 134 S. 
Ct. 594, and cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 822 (2013). In return, the union “promised to lend financial support 
to a ballot initiative regarding casino gaming . . . [and] promised to refrain from picketing, boycotting, 
striking, or undertaking other economic activity against [the employer].” Id. The employer, Hollywood 
Greyhound Track, Inc., doing business as Mardi Gras Gaming, operated a dog track. Mulhall v. Unite 
Here Local 355, No. 08-61766-CIV, 2009 WL 8711022, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 22, 2009), rev’d, 618 F.3d 
1279 (11th Cir. 2010). The union, Unite Here, represents “workers throughout the U.S. and Canada who 
work in the hotel, gaming, food service, manufacturing, textile, distribution, laundry, and airport 
industries.” UNITE HERE!, http://www.unitehere.org/about/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2013). 
 59. Mulhall, 2009 WL 8711022, at *1. 
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Unite Here brought suit to compel arbitration.60 Martin Mulhall, an 
employee who had worked as a parimutuel clerk and a groundskeeper 
for forty years and who opposed being unionized, sued to enjoin 
enforcement of the agreement, contending that its enforcement would 
violate Section 302 of LMRA.61 
The Eleventh Circuit held that because “organizing assistance” 
could constitute a “thing of value,” such neutrality agreements were a 
Section 302 violation on the employer’s part.62 Noting that it disagreed 
with the Third and Fourth Circuits on this issue, 63  the court first 
highlighted that, because Congress has included the phrase “thing of 
value” in other criminal statutes, it has evolved “‘into a term of art 
which the courts generally construe to envelop[] both tangibles and 
intangibles.’”64 
Second, it agreed with the Second Circuit that “common sense 
should inform determinations of whether an improper benefit has been 
conferred.”65 It found important that, “[i]f employers offer organizing 
assistance with the intention of improperly influencing a union, then 
the policy concerns in [Section] 302—curbing bribery and extortion—
are implicated.”66 However, improper intention aside, this decision 
                                                                                                                 
 60. Id. 
 61. Mulhall, 667 F.3d at 1213; Mulhall, 2009 WL 8711022, at *1. 
 62. Mulhall, 667 F.3d at 1213. 
 63. See discussion supra Part I.C.2. 
 64. Mulhall, 667 F.3d at 1214 (citing United States v. Nilsen, 967 F.2d 539, 542 (11th Cir. 1992) (per 
curiam)). This determination that intangibles can nonetheless still have value (at least, within the meaning 
of Section 302) is a focal point of Mulhall’s position before the United States Supreme Court with respect 
to Unite Here’s certiorari petition. In Adcock, the Fourth Circuit took a different position, finding support 
for the converse proposition in two other places in Section 302. First, the “penalty provision” of the statute 
calls for a sliding scale of the severity of penalties for violation. Adcock v. Freightliner LLC, 550 F.3d 
369, 375 (4th Cir. 2008). “Thus, Congress clearly intended [Section] 302’s ‘thing of value’ to have at least 
some ascertainable value.” Id. Second, the language of Section 302 prohibits agreements to “‘pay, lend, 
or deliver . . . any money or other thing of value.’” Id. at 376. Since the concessions made to and the 
collateral benefits enjoyed by the union under such an agreement cannot be “delivered,” neutrality 
agreements cannot come within the meaning of this provision. Id. As a matter of statutory interpretation, 
the Fourth Circuit declined to “attempt to stretch [Section] 302 beyond its limits” and to apply Section 
302 “in a manner inconsistent with both the statute’s plain language and Congress’ intent in passing the 
statute.” Id. at 377. 
 65. Mulhall, 667 F.3d at 1215 (citing United States v. Roth, 333 F.2d 450, 454 (2d Cir. 1964)). 
 66. Id. This analysis is notable, because it makes the subjective intent of the employer factor into the 
objective determination of whether or not its concessions have “value.” This appears nowhere in the 
statutory framework of Section 302. See Larkin, supra note 8 (“In reaching this ruling, the court read into 
the statute a specific intent requirement that is not there.”); see also 2 Guide to Emp. Law & Reg. § 17A:29 
14
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seems to make the inferential step between entering into a neutrality 
agreement and illegal labor practices, such as bribery and extortion 
much more easily than other courts have.67 
2.   Deconstructing “Organizing Assistance”: “Active” Versus 
“Passive” as the Key Factor 
Another way to evaluate whether organizing assistance provided for 
in a neutrality agreement constitutes a “thing of value” within the 
meaning of Section 302 is to deconstruct the type of assistance for 
which the agreement provides. Generally, an employer can react in 
three ways in response to a union organizing drive.68 First, it can resist 
unionization altogether—this could not constitute a “thing of value” to 
a union because, on its face, it works against the broad union interest 
in the success of an organizing campaign.69 
The more important distinction is between the second and third 
forms of employer responses to union organizing efforts. On one hand, 
an employer can provide a form of “passive” assistance, whereby it 
simply acquiesces to the union’s prerogatives and agrees to go along 
with the ultimate result of the organizing campaign.70 This type of 
assistance is less likely to implicate Section 302’s “thing of value” 
provision.71 Even if a union considers such assistance to be “valuable” 
within the meaning of Section 302, it arguably cannot be “‘lent’ or 
‘delivered,’” which is an essential element of Section 302’s 
prohibition. 72  On the other hand, an employer can provide more 
                                                                                                                 
(2012) (“Innocuous ground rules between unions and employers can become illegal payments if used as 
valuable consideration in a scheme to corrupt a union or to extort a benefit from an employer.”). 
 67. See Hotel Emps. Union, Local 57 v. Sage Hospitality Res., LLC, 390 F.3d 206, 219 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(“Not surprisingly, Sage is unable to provide any legal support for the remarkable assertion that entering 
into a valid labor agreement governing recognition of a labor union amounts to illegal labor bribery.”). 
 68. Carter & Burton, supra note 9, at 190. 
 69. Id. This response is by far the most common among employers, and given that it is likely to lessen 
the success of an organizing drive, it is the “form unions try to avoid with the use of neutrality 
agreements.” Id. 
 70. Id. Elaborating on this form of employer conduct, these authors continue: “For example, employers 
agree to remain silent during a campaign or not insist on a Board-supervised election. Employers are 
simply inactive during and non-resistant to union organizing efforts.” Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 186(a) (2006); Carter & Burton, supra note 9, at 
190 (noting that, because passive employer conduct may not, arguably, be “‘lent’ or ‘delivered,’” it 
15
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“active” assistance, in which it may agree to certain concessions above 
and beyond the “bare bones” agreement of a neutral position on the 
outcome of the organizing efforts.73 This type of conduct is more likely 
to constitute a “thing of value” in the context of Section 302 “because 
the employer is actively doing something for a union.”74 
Semantically, this way of evaluating organizing assistance is 
vulnerable to the counterargument that stood at the heart of the Fourth 
Circuit’s rationale in Adcock v. Freightliner LLC. Simply put, the fact 
that a union may realize some benefit from the structure and content 
of a neutrality agreement does not automatically mean those provisions 
have “value” as a categorical matter. 75  Understandably, the 
relationship between an employer and a prospective union can be 
rather complex, as both seek to protect their own interests throughout 
the organizing process.76 It may be unwise to place a categorical bar 
on certain provisions, like those at issue in Mulhall, where the line 
between a “benefit” and a “thing of value” is unclear. Rather, such 
categorical limits on organizing assistance should be limited to 
provisions where the “value” to a union is much more tangible and 
more clearly goes beyond a mere “benefit.”77 
In her dissent in Mulhall, Judge Restani voiced her agreement with 
the rationales of the Third and Fourth Circuits and her belief that 
                                                                                                                 
follows that “[p]ure employer neutrality and card check arrangements are, therefore, more likely than not 
lawful under [S]ection 302”). Of course, this analysis presumes that “passive” assistance does come within 
the meaning of a “thing of value,” which is a proposition that should not so easily be inferred, as this Note 
discusses further in this section II.A.2. 
 73. Carter & Burton, supra note 9, at 190–91. Elaborating on “active” forms of employer assistance, 
these authors continue: “[A]ctive employer organizing assistance, such as granting organizers access to 
the workforce during working hours and compelling employees to attend union proselytizing meetings 
during working hours, besides being a ‘thing of value,’ can be, and is, lent or delivered to the union . . . .” 
Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 74. Id. at 191 (“The distinction is akin to the difference between misfeasance and nonfeasance, with 
misfeasance being to torts what active employer assistance is to [S]ection 302. There is indeed (or at least 
should be) a relevant difference in the [S]ection 302 analysis between assistance and acquiescence, or 
action and inaction.”). 
 75. Adcock v. Freightliner LLC, 550 F.3d 369, 375 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 76. See Brudney, supra note 33, at 824–40. 
 77. Evaluating these provisions objectively should focus on the significance of the asset to the union. 
This should favor a factual determination of that issue over a categorical bar on the use of such provisions. 
See Lalas, supra note 11, at 543 (discussing Dana Corp., 356 N.L.R.B. No. 49 (2010), which upheld an 
organizing agreement with more substantive provisions than those at issue in Mulhall and permitting “a 
‘certain amount of employer cooperation with the efforts of a union to organize’”). 
16
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improper intent is not relevant to the determination of whether the 
organizing assistance provisions could constitute a “thing of value” 
under Section 302.78 Given that “LMRA is designed to promote both 
labor peace and collective bargaining,” she observed that “LMRA 
cannot promote collective bargaining and, at the same time, penalize 
unions that are attempting to achieve greater collective bargaining 
rights.”79 By departing from the Third and Fourth Circuits’ decisions 
as to whether such agreements constitute a “thing of value” within the 
meaning of Section 302 of LMRA, the Eleventh Circuit has created a 
circuit split on the issue. 80  Consequently, its decision poses 
ramifications for future Eleventh Circuit jurisprudence pertaining to 
neutrality agreements. 81  It also presents the possibility that an 
employer or a union that is a party to a neutrality agreement can use 
Section 302 of LMRA as grounds to not enforce the agreement if 
harmony between the two parties ceases at some point in time after it 
is made.82 
Petitions for certiorari and supporting memoranda were filed on the 
parts of both Unite Here Local 355 and Martin Mulhall. 83  After 
                                                                                                                 
 78. Mulhall v. Unite Here Local 355, 667 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2012) (Restani, J., dissenting) 
(stating rather that the focus should remain on “whether a union that demands these types of concessions 
with an improper intent commits extortion and thereby runs afoul of [Section] 302” (which Mulhall did 
not allege in his complaint) and also pointing out that “[a]dding the element of intent is a non-starter 
because to do so conflicts with the purpose of the LMRA regardless of whether the focus is the concessions 
or the intent behind them”), cert. dismissed, 134 S. Ct. 594, and cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 822 (2013). 
 79. Id. at 1216–17 (Restani, J., dissenting). Pointing out that Mulhall’s complaint alleged that the 
enforcement of the agreement violated Section 302 of LMRA, Judge Restani voiced her agreement with 
the Fourth Circuit in Adcock that “‘[b]y no stretch of the imagination are the concessions a means of 
bribing representatives of the Union[.]’” Id. at 1216 n.1 (Restani, J., dissenting) (citing Adcock, 550 F.3d 
at 375). 
 80. See discussion supra Part I.C.2. 
 81. In the view of the Third Circuit, interpreting neutrality agreements as “things of value” “would 
wreak havoc on the carefully balanced structure of the laws governing recognition of and bargaining with 
unions.” Hotel Emps. Union, Local 57 v. Sage Hospitality Res., LLC, 390 F.3d 206, 219 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 82. For example, during the time that Martin Mulhall’s case against Unite Here was pending in the 
Southern District of Florida and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Mardi Gras (Mulhall’s employer) 
began taking the position that the neutrality agreement with Unite Here was unenforceable on the basis 
that its enforcement would violate Section 302 of LMRA. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 
4, Unite Here Local 355 v. Mulhall, Mulhall v. Unite Here Local 355, 134 S. Ct. 594 (2013) (Nos. 12-99, 
12-312), 2013 WL 2316734. After arbitration proceedings on that issue, an arbitrator disagreed and found 
that the agreement was enforceable, and that ruling was upheld by a Southern District of Florida federal 
court. Id. 
 83. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Unite Here Local 355 v. Mulhall, 134 S. Ct. 594 (2012) (No. 12-
99), 2012 WL 3027183; Conditional Cross-Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Unite Here Local 355 v. 
17
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inviting an amicus curiae brief from the United States on the issue, the 
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on June 24, 2013.84 
However, after the case had been fully briefed and argued, the Court 
dismissed the writ as improvidently granted on December 10, 2013.85 
Thus, the debate over the legality of neutrality agreements that provide 
organizing assistance continues without definitive guidance from our 
highest court.86 
B.   Why Neutrality Agreements with Union Organizing Assistance 
Should Not Constitute a “Thing of Value” 
1.   Statutory Support for Upholding Employer-Union Contractual 
Agreements, Most Notably Within LMRA 
A powerful argument in support of the proposition that neutrality 
and card check agreements do not constitute a “thing of value” under 
                                                                                                                 
Mulhall, 134 S. Ct. 594 (2012) (No. 12-312), 2012 WL 4042969; Respondent Martin Mulhall’s 
Memorandum in Support of the Petition, Unite Here Local 355 v. Mulhall, 134 S. Ct. 594 (2012) (No. 12-
99), 2012 WL 3613484. 
 84. Unite Here Local 355 v. Mulhall, 81 U.S.L.W. 3066 (U.S. June 24, 2013) (No. 12-99). In its 
amicus curiae brief submitted to the Supreme Court, the United States contended that “the court of appeals 
went astray in concluding that the legitimacy of such agreements turns on an inquiry into the parties’ 
intent.” Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9, Mulhall, 134 S. Ct. 594 (Nos. 12-99, 12-312), 
2013 WL 2316734. However, it implored the Court not to intervene at this time for two reasons. First, 
“[o]nly three courts of appeals have addressed the underlying issues, and further consideration in the lower 
courts would benefit this Court should review eventually be justified.” Id. Second, since the case has 
reached the Supreme Court in an interlocutory posture (from a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)), “further proceedings on remand may clarify the 
decision’s effects.” Id. Lastly, it posited that a question of mootness existed, given that the challenged 
agreement was no longer in force. Id. 
 85. Unite Here Local 355 v. Mulhall, 134 S. Ct. 594 (2013) (per curiam). In a dissent joined by Justices 
Sotomayor and Kagan, Justice Breyer identified mootness as a possible issue, also raised by the United 
States in its amicus brief with respect to the certiorari petitions, as well as two other issues. Id. at 594–95 
(Breyer, J., dissenting); see also supra note 84. First, he pointed out that “it is arguable that . . . Mulhall, 
the sole plaintiff in this case, lacks Article III standing.” Mulhall, 134 S. Ct. at 595 (Breyer, J. dissenting). 
Second, he raised the question of whether Section 302 still authorizes a private right of action, given the 
Court’s “more restrictive views on private rights of action in recent decades.” Id. While any of these three 
issues could have prevented the Court from reaching the merits of the Section 302 question, the dissenting 
justices would have instead favored further briefing on those issues. Id. at 594–95. 
 86. See, e.g., William Gould, Opinion Analysis: Union Organizing Lives to Fight Another Day—But 
so do its Opponents, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 11, 2013, 4:56 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/12/ 
opinion-analysis-union-organizing-lives-to-fight-another-day-but-so-do-its-opponents/ (“[C]ourts will 
remain divided on union neutrality agreements, so that their lawfulness (as will any ‘collective-bargaining 
process’ which addresses them) will remain uncertain.”). 
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Section 302 of LMRA is LMRA’s internal statutory support for 
upholding and enforcing otherwise valid contractual agreements 
between employers and unions. 87  Most notably, Congress enacted 
Section 301(a) of LMRA concurrently with Section 302.88 This section 
gives federal courts jurisdiction over breach of contract actions 
between an employer and a labor organization representing 
employees.89 The importance of this provision cannot be understated. 
Under LMRA, “the [National Labor Relations Board] has exclusive 
jurisdiction over activities which are clearly or arguably subject to 
Sections 7 and 8 of the Act—sufficient to preempt state and federal 
courts from asserting concurrent jurisdiction.”90 However, suits under 
Section 301 of LMRA comprise one of two areas in which federal 
courts reserve jurisdiction in labor-management relation matters.91 
The fact that federal courts retain jurisdiction over Section 301 suits, 
which “are frequently filed to enforce arbitration provisions of 
collective bargaining contracts,” strongly suggests that the purpose of 
Section 301(a) was “to make labor contracts equally binding on both 
employers and unions, to the end of promoting industrial peace 
through the enforcement of these contracts, including the no-strike 
clauses Congress expected would be included in them.”92 Moreover, 
contracts enforceable under Section 301(a) include agreements 
                                                                                                                 
 87. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 83, at 11–16. 
 88. Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2006). 
 89. Id. § 185(a). 
 90. GORDON E. JACKSON, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW DESK BOOK 25 (1986). Section 7 is 
codified at 29 U.S.C. § 157 and Section 8 is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158. Jackson also points out that any 
question of whether or not NLRB enjoys such exclusive jurisdiction over such activities was answered 
affirmatively in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). Id. at 25 & n.2. 
With reference to Congress’s intent in regulating labor-management relations under LMRA, the Supreme 
Court commented, “[b]y the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress did not exhaust the full sweep of legislative power 
over industrial relations given by the Commerce Clause. Congress formulated a code whereby it outlawed 
some aspects of labor activities and left others free for the operation of economic forces.” Garmon, 359 
U.S. at 240 (quoting Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 480–81 (1955)). 
 91. JACKSON, supra note 90, at 27. The other major area of suits over which federal courts retained 
exclusive jurisdiction under LMRA comprised suits brought under Section 303 of LMRA, which “grants 
jurisdiction to federal district courts to entertain suits brought by business or property owners who are 
injured as a result of a labor union engaging in, inducing, or encouraging strikes or secondary boycotts 
prohibited by Section 8(b)(4) of the LMRA.” Id. Both types of actions may be brought in federal district 
courts without regard to the amount-in-controversy or citizenship requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Id. 
 92. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 83, at 12–13 (citing Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 
353 U.S. 448, 453–54 (1957)); JACKSON, supra note 90, at 27. 
19
Mollohan: Employer-Union Organizing Assistance and Neutrality Agreements: H
Published by Reading Room, 2014
904 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:3 
between employers and labor organizations that are significant to 
mutual labor peace. 93  Importantly, neutrality agreements can 
contribute significantly to maintaining labor peace between labor 
unions and employers.94 
More recently, courts that have reviewed the enforceability of 
neutrality and card check agreements have sought to ensure the 
presence of employee freedom of choice as to whether or not to 
support unionization, and they have widely held that the “presence of 
a card check arrangement qualifies as such an opportunity [to allow 
employees to choose whether to accept or reject the union].”95 Even 
the NLRB has taken the position that card checks enjoy a presumption 
of validity.96 In fact, the NLRB recently pointed out that voluntary 
recognition of a union “predates the National Labor Relations Act and 
is undisputedly lawful under it.”97 
To some, this argument only goes so far. Federal courts have held 
that, “while union representation issues are within the primary 
jurisdiction of the [NLRB], neutrality and card check agreements are 
enforceable in federal court as long as they are consistent with federal 
labor law.”98 In other words, the agreement’s ultimate enforceability 
hinges on the lack of any other labor law violation contained within 
the agreement. However, firmly making this determination is difficult, 
given the broad and vague nature of Section 302’s language, and 
                                                                                                                 
 93. Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17, 28 (1962); Cohen, Santucci & 
Fritts, supra note 35, at 525 (“Section 301 jurisdiction applies to a wide range of labor contracts, and not 
just a traditional collective bargaining agreement which may be negotiated only if the union has achieved 
representative status.”). Notably, the decision from which Cohen, Santucci, and Fritts derive this 
proposition arose from the Second Circuit (Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union Local 217 v. J.P. 
Morgan Hotel, 996 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1993)), that also decided United States v. Roth, 333 F.2d 450 (2d 
Cir. 1964), discussed in Part I.C supra. Indeed, “[c]ourts have repeatedly upheld labor-management 
agreements providing for arbitration over recognition disputes.” Hotel Emps. Union, Local 57 v. Sage 
Hospitality Res., LLC, 390 F.3d 206, 219 (3d Cir. 2004) (referring to J.P. Morgan, 996 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 
1993) and Hotel Emps. Union, Local 2 v. Marriott Corp., 961 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir. 1992) as support for 
this proposition). 
 94. See, e.g., Lalas, supra note 11, at 541 (“Agreements that create a ‘framework’ for 
organizing . . . are also consistent with the Act’s goal of promoting ‘industrial peace’ and allow for more 
employer free choice, not less.”). 
 95. Brudney, supra note 33, at 861. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Lamons Gasket Co., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 2011 WL 3916075, at *4 (Aug. 26, 2011) (internal 
citation omitted). 
 98. Cohen, Santucci & Fritts, supra note 35, at 521 (emphasis added). 
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consequently, requires an inquiry into Congress’s intent in enacting 
Section 302.99 
2.   Congress’s Intent in Enacting Section 302 
a.   Construing “Thing of Value” With Reference to Preceding 
Textual Companion of “Money” in Statute’s Text 
Courts follow several canons of construction when interpreting 
statutes. 100  The first and foremost of these canons is the “plain 
meaning rule,” that a court should presume that “‘Congress says in a 
statute what it means and means in a statute what it says.’” 101 
However, when a statute’s words are ambiguous, as is the case with 
Section 302 of LMRA, courts properly consider the context in which 
the words are used in order to read them as a whole and avoid 
construing statutory phrases by themselves in isolation. 102  In a 
situation where general word(s) (in this case, “thing of value”) follow 
specific word(s) (in this case, “money”) in a statute, the general words 
should be construed “‘to embrace only objects similar in nature to 
those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.’”103 
Construing such employer “organizing assistance,” like that 
provided for in the neutrality agreement in Mulhall, arguably would 
expand the interpretation of “thing of value” to encompass intangible 
items that have no ascertainable value, rather than restrict the phrase 
                                                                                                                 
 99. See discussion infra Part II.B.2. 
 100. See, e.g., Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992) (“[C]anons of construction are 
no more than rules of thumb that help courts determine the meaning of legislation . . . .”). 
 101. Ayes v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 473 F.3d 104, 108 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing Hartford 
Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 102. Id. (citing United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828 (1984)). In contrast, when a statute’s words 
are unambiguous, then “this first canon is also the last: ‘judicial inquiry is complete.’” Id. (citing Germain, 
503 U.S. at 254). 
 103. Wash. State Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 384 
(2003) (citing Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114–15 (2001)). The tenets of esjudem 
generis (“of the same kind”) and noscitur a sociis (“a word is known by the company it keeps”) are used 
to prevent “‘the giving of unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress.’” Id. at 384–85 (quoting Jarecki v. 
G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961)); see also Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & 
Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 36 (1998) (characterizing the construing of statutory provision(s) in isolation as the 
“use of blinders”). 
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to its companion reference to “money.”104 Any subjective valuation by 
the union of the employer’s conduct does not automatically demand an 
abstract interpretation of Section 302, which uses the phrase “thing of 
value” restrictively in companion with “money,” and potentially 
undermines the scope of Congress’s intent in enacting this section.105 
Thus, unless an employee challenging the enforceability of a neutrality 
agreement providing for organizing assistance can establish that the 
assistance is an asset significant enough to have some sort of “value,” 
these tenets suggest that the statute should be read restrictively to 
preserve Congress’s legislative intent. 
b.   Lack of Mention in Statute and Legislative History 
Despite the rise and increasing popularity of neutrality agreements 
in labor union organizing efforts,106 there is a surprising dearth of 
mention of these agreements in legislative and administrative materials 
pertaining to federal labor law outlining unfair labor practices. 107 
Granted, when enacting Taft-Hartley, Congress intended to enumerate 
                                                                                                                 
 104. Section 302 of LMRA makes it unlawful for “any employer . . . to pay, lend, or deliver . . . any 
money or other thing of value . . . to any labor organization, or any officer or employee thereof, which 
represents, seeks to represent, or would admit to membership, any of the employees of such 
employer . . . . ” Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 186(a)(2) (2006) (emphasis added). Such 
an interpretation would define “thing of value” in the abstract, rather than objectively, and seems to violate 
this tenet, which demands a restrictive interpretation of this phrase, a general residual category, only with 
reference to the preceding specific thing of “money.” See Keffeler, 537 U.S. at 385 (“[T]he usual rules of 
statutory construction should [not] get short shrift for the sake of reading ‘other legal process[,]’ [(the 
general residual phrase at issue in Keffeler),] in abstract breadth.”). 
 105. Cf. Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 490 (2006) (“Congress expressed the intent to 
immunize only a subset of postal wrongdoing, not all torts committed in the course of mail delivery.”). 
 106. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 107. Simply put, both employers and unions do not enjoy the benefit of comprehensive administrative 
guidance on the “thing of value” issue in this context. The Department of Labor has mandated disclosure 
of financial transactions and interest transfers between employers and unions under the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, or “LMRDA,” requiring employees to identify these items 
on a form filed with the Department of Labor. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 
U.S.C. §§ 401–531 (2006). However, the policy-serving function of this statute only goes so far. As 
previously discussed, the Fourth Circuit pointed out in Adcock that a neutrality agreement or the 
concessions made therein have no “ascertainable value.” Adcock v. Freightliner LLC, 550 F.3d 369, 375 
(4th Cir. 2008) (“Congress clearly intended [Section] 302’s ‘thing of value’ to have at least some 
ascertainable value. In this case, unquestionably, the concessions made by Freightliner, which simply 
involved allowing the Union access to Freightliner’s employees, have no such whatsoever.”). As a result, 
no law requiring disclosure of certain financial transactions between an employer and a union can reach 
neutrality agreements. 
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practices that would be prohibited, rather than to enumerate those that 
were lawful. 108  However, Congress has subsequently amended 
LMRA, and specifically Section 302, without adding any provisions 
governing neutrality agreements.109 
In fairness, the argument that because Congress has not legislatively 
addressed the use of neutrality agreements and organizing assistance 
provisions within them they do not violate Section 302 of LMRA cuts 
both ways. Congress did provide several exemptions, nine in total, to 
Section 302’s prohibitions. 110  An exemption for organizing is not 
included among them, and as a result, some could argue that Congress 
intended no such exemption by virtue of the principle expressio unius 
est exclusio alterius (“the express mention of one thing excludes all 
others”). 111  Still, Congress’s failure to include an exemption for 
organizing can ostensibly be explained by the virtual, if not total, 
nonexistence of neutrality agreements at the time LMRA was 
enacted.112 In sum: (1) neutrality agreements have been used widely 
for the past four decades; (2) Congress has revisited the statutory 
                                                                                                                 
 108. See, e.g., MILLIS & BROWN, supra note 2, at 457 (“[T]he intent of the Congress was to proscribe 
many types of union behavior designed to obtain labor’s objectives . . . [a] list of things remaining lawful 
is not too significant.”). 
 109. BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Local 227, Int’l Chem. Workers Union, 791 F.2d 1046, 1053 (2d Cir. 
1986) (noting Congress’s purpose of preventing bribery and extortion in enacting Section 302 of LMRA 
and “[i]n enacting amendments . . . Congress reaffirmed the purpose of [Section] 302 as the limited one 
of ‘prevent[ing] bribery, extortion, shakedowns, and other corrupt practices’”) (internal citation omitted). 
Congress amended Section 302 of LMRA in 1959, 1969, and 1973, and more recently, several pieces of 
legislation to amend LMRA have been introduced in the House of Representatives. Brudney, supra note 
33, at 841–44; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 83, at 8–9. 
 110. The exemptions listed in Section 302(c)(1)-(9) of LMRA include (1) payments to an employee or 
former employee “as compensation for” or “by reason of” his service to the employer; (2) payments to 
satisfy a judgment or settlement; (3) payments for a commodity at market rate; (4) payments of union 
membership dues deducted from employee wages; (5) payments to a union trust fund for the benefit of 
employees, their families, and their dependents; (6) payments to a trust fund for pooled vacation, holiday, 
severance or similar benefits, or defraying costs of apprenticeships or training programs; (7) payments to 
a trust fund for scholarships for employees, their families, and their dependents, for child care centers, or 
for employee housing assistance; (8) payments to a trust fund for “defraying the costs of legal services for 
employees, their families, and their dependents for counsel”; and (9) payments to a “plant, area, or 
industrywide labor management committee” established for a purpose under Section 5(b) of the Labor 
Management Cooperation Act of 1978. Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(1)–(9) 
(2006). 
 111. Respondent Martin Mulhall’s Memorandum in Support of the Petition at 10, Unite Here Local 355 
v. Mulhall, 134 S. Ct. 594 (2012) (No. 12-99), 2012 WL 3613484. 
 112. The use of neutrality agreements in the employer-union organizing context did not begin until the 
1970s and did not reach full proliferation until the 1990s. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
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structure of LMRA several times in this period; (3) Congress has 
examined the relationship of neutrality agreements to existing federal 
labor law principles, and; (4) Congress has not legislatively prohibited 
their use.113 Consequently, courts that have expressly given more in-
depth consideration to Congress’s intent when interpreting the phrase 
“thing of value” (such as the Second Circuit in Adcock) have found 
that common provisions for organizing assistance within neutrality 
agreements do not implicate this provision.114 
c.   Failure to Necessarily Corrupt a Union and to Necessarily 
Implicate Congress’s Anti-Bribery and Extortion Purpose in 
Enacting Section 302 
As previously mentioned, Congress was concerned with bribery, 
extortion, and the like when it enacted and subsequently amended 
Section 302 of LMRA. 115  However, provisions for organizing 
assistance within neutrality agreements may operate merely to do two 
things: (1) to make the union organization process less contentious and 
(2) to allow the union to perform its duties if recognized by a 
majority.116 To be consistent with Congress’s intent in enacting this 
statute, the provisions should serve core interests of employees and 
core functions of unions. The agreement should not inhibit individual 
employees’ rights—to join the union or pay dues, to accept union 
representation if not established by a majority, and to speak out against 
accepting union representation during the organization process. 117 
                                                                                                                 
 113. As previously noted, several pieces of legislation pertaining to the recognition of unions via 
neutrality and card check agreements have been introduced in Congress. Brudney, supra note 33, at 841–
44. For a brief discussion of these attempts, see discussion infra Part III.A.1. 
 114. Adcock v. Freightliner LLC, 550 F.3d 369, 375 (4th Cir. 2008) (“Our reading of the statute is 
consistent with the purposes of [Section] 302.”). 
 115. See Toth v. USX Corp., 883 F.2d 1297, 1300 (7th Cir. 1989) (“It is fairly universally 
acknowledged that a central purpose of [S]ection 302 as a whole was to prevent employers from bribing 
union officials.”); see also Turner v. Local Union No. 302, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 604 F.2d 1219, 1227 
(9th Cir. 1979); Bricklayers Int’l Union, Local 15 v. Stuart Plastering Co., 512 F.2d 1017, 1024 (5th Cir. 
1975). 
 116. Charles I. Cohen, Neutrality Agreements: Will the NLRB Sanction Its Own Obsolescence?, 16 
LAB. LAW. 201, 201–02 (2000); George N. Davies, Neutrality Agreements: Basic Principles of 
Enforcement and Available Remedies, 16 LAB. LAW. 215, 215 (2000). 
 117. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 83, at 10. 
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Moreover, the agreement should not compromise the union’s duty of 
fair representation to the employees.118 
Certain specific provisions, like those at issue in Mulhall, that are 
less likely on their face to implicate Congress’s purpose in enacting 
Section 302 of LMRA would seem to require the pleading and proving 
of more facts sufficient to implicate bribery, extortion, and the like. 
Certain provisions for organizing assistance, like those at issue in 
Mulhall (such as union access to company property and employees’ 
names and addresses), have not been questioned by courts interpreting 
Section 302’s “thing of value” language despite their longstanding use 
and implementation.119  Moreover, the upholding of these types of 
provisions in the face of Section 302 makes more sense when viewed 
alongside provisions that have been held to violate Section 302, such 
as those providing for retroactive payments to union employees or 
monetary kickbacks in exchange for assent to a collective bargaining 
agreement.120 
III.   COMING FULL CIRCLE: FAVORING RETAINING EMPLOYER-UNION 
STABILITY OVER LESS-THAN-THREATENING POLICY CONCERNS 
In light of the arguments on both sides of the issue of whether 
organizing assistance within neutrality agreements should be 
considered a “thing of value” for the purposes of Section 302 of 
LMRA, taking a stance on one side is a delicate task that brings several 
policy considerations into focus. However, many of the concerns held 
                                                                                                                 
 118. Id. at 9. 
 119. For support for the proposition that provisions for union access to employer property have been 
upheld, see, e.g., Facet Enters., Inc. v. NLRB, 907 F.2d 963, 983 (10th Cir. 1990) (characterizing plant 
access as one of the “important areas of labor-management relations”). For support for the proposition 
that provisions for the giving of employees’ names and addresses should survive section 302, see, e.g., 
Wyman-Gordon Co. v. NLRB, 397 F.2d 394, 396 (1st Cir. 1968) (“[W]e are not greatly impressed by the 
contention that compelling a list of names and addresses forces appellant to . . . give a ‘thing of value’ to 
a labor organization, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 186.” (dictum)), rev’d, 394 U.S. 759 (1969). 
 120. See, e.g., United States v. Philips, 19 F.3d 1565, 1566–69 (11th Cir. 1994), amended by 59 F.3d 
1095 (11th Cir. 1995) (examining union officials’ acceptance of an unfavorable agreement in exchange 
for the employer’s agreement to make retroactive pension payments for themselves and other union 
employees); United States v. Bloch, 696 F.2d 1213, 1214 (9th Cir. 1982) (dealing with payoffs to union 
officials so that they would except the employer from a union’s standing local hiring requirement), 
abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Jimenez Recio, 537 U.S. 270 (2003). 
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by those who might favor classifying certain forms of organizing 
assistance contained within neutrality agreements as Section 302 
“things of value,” like those at issue in Mulhall, are not as grave in 
practice as they are in theory. For the following reasons, if the Supreme 
Court reviews this issue, it should not classify such forms of 
organizing assistance within neutrality agreements as a “thing of 
value” in a way that would violate Section 302 of LMRA. 
A.   Some Opposing Policy Considerations 
1.   “Privatizing” Labor Law 
As previously discussed, there are several reasons that both 
employers and unions enter into neutrality agreements. 121  Unions 
generally enter into neutrality agreements to increase their 
membership. 122  However, commentators criticize neutrality 
agreements by characterizing their use as the “privatization” of labor 
law.123 These criticisms focus on the idea that this “privatization has 
the secondary consequence of placing in the hands of private 
individuals serving as arbitrators some powers that had previously 
been the exclusive province of the NLRB, and other powers that even 
the NLRB never possessed.”124 
Truthfully, “today the Board-supervised election is all but dying.”125 
However, despite this concern, federal labor law has not prohibited this 
practice on the part of employers and unions, and has instead retained 
the parties’ freedom to contract.126 Granted, the NLRB has commented 
                                                                                                                 
 121. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 122. Cooper, supra note 37, at 1589 (“In entering into neutrality/card check agreements, unions have 
focused on their goal of increasing union representation.”). 
 123. Id. One study examining the use of neutrality agreements in the union-organizing context estimates 
that a vast majority of these agreements “call[] for some form of dispute resolution” and that “[t]he process 
most frequently stipulated was arbitration.” Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 40, at 48 (noting that more than 
ninety percent of the agreements analyzed in their study stipulated a method for resolving disputes). 
 124. Cooper, supra note 37, at 1589. “[S]cant attention has been directed to what neutrality agreements 
require of arbitrators and whether these expectations are consistent with the institutional capacity and role 
of arbitrators.” Id. at 1589–90. 
 125. Carter & Burton, supra note 9, at 173-74 (referring to the sharp decline in union representation 
petitions filed with the Board between 1997, in which 6,719 were filed, and 2006, in which 3,643 were 
filed). 
 126. Davies, supra note 116, at 217 (“[I]t is clear that unions and employers can resolve representational 
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that “the time has come to take a ‘critical look’ at the law regarding 
neutrality agreements,” as this trend toward recognizing unions via 
neutrality agreements has grown largely outside of the NLRB’s 
administrative framework.127  However, recent legislative efforts to 
curb or prohibit outright the use of neutrality agreements have not 
made their way into federal law. 128  For example, in 2002, eight 
Republican House members, including the majority leader, introduced 
H.R. 4636, a bill to prohibit card check recognition.129 In 2004, thirty-
three Republican House members co-sponsored H.R. 4343, a similar 
bill.130 
In fact, a piece of legislation, entitled the “Employee Free Choice 
Act,” which would recognize union formation through majority sign-
up, has been introduced in very recent Congressional sessions. 131 
Support for this bill is more prevalent than for bills that would prohibit 
the use of card check agreements, as it passed the House once already 
in 2007, and should it pass both houses in the same Congress, President 
Obama has indicated his willingness to sign it into law. 132  This 
suggests that any legislative action on neutrality and card check 
agreements is more likely to favor privatization of labor union 
organization rather than rejection of it altogether. 
2.   Coercion of Disenfranchised Employees to Join a Union 
As previously discussed, employees who sue to enjoin the 
enforcement of neutrality agreements that provide for organizing 
assistance on the theory that they constitute a violation of Section 302 
of LMRA are largely motivated by their desire not to work as a part of 
a unionized workforce, as has previously been the case.133 To serve 
                                                                                                                 
issues in neutrality agreements privately and commit these matters to contracts that will be subject to 
enforcement under [S]ection 301 and not run afoul of the NLRB’s primary jurisdiction.”). 
 127. Cohen, Santucci & Fritts, supra note 35, at 521–22, 539. 
 128. Brudney, supra note 33, at 841. 
 129. H.R. 4636, 107th Cong. (2002). 
 130. H.R. 4343, 108th Cong. (2004). 
 131. The Employee Free Choice Act, INT’L BHD. OF ELEC. WORKERS, http://www.ibew.org/efca/ 
index.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2013). 
 132. Mark Koba, Unions Seeking Comeback: Obama ‘Owes Them Big Time’, CNBC (Nov. 13, 2012, 
10:48 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/49762716. 
 133. See, e.g., Mulhall v. Unite Here Local 355, 667 F.3d 1211, 1213 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. dismissed, 
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this interest, states have provided for a person’s “right to work” (either 
by constitutional or statutory provision) and generally prohibit an 
employer from requiring an employee to join or to remain a member 
of a union as a condition of employment.134 
However, the theory that the use of neutrality agreements leads to 
undue coercion of employees to join a union does not play out so 
grimly in practice. Simply put, “there is no basis for inferring that 
neutrality agreements systemically inhibit the expressive options of 
employees who wish to oppose unionization.”135 Indeed, a neutrality 
agreement between an employer and a union does not bind an 
individual employee, who is not a party to the contract.136 As a result, 
employees remain free to speak out against unionization, and empirical 
studies have shown that “employees resisting unions retain an effective 
voice.”137 But as a policy matter, the NLRB favors union recognition 
based on a majority selection and has stated that no opposing policy 
considerations to bar enforcing neutrality agreements exist, and 
employees should routinely enjoy the right to opt out of union 
representation.138 
Still, despite the fact that neutrality agreements may not violate an 
employee’s individual rights under “right to work” statutes, some 
argue that their use leads to misconduct in the card signature process 
that is designed to raise the chances of the campaign’s overall 
success.139 Three prominent examples of such misconduct on the part 
                                                                                                                 
134 S. Ct. 594, and cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 822 (2013); Adcock v. Freightliner LLC, 550 F.3d 369, 373 
(4th Cir. 2008). 
 134. JACKSON, supra note 90, at 28, 540. See generally FLA. CONST. art. I, § 6 (“The right of persons 
to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of membership or non-membership in any labor union 
or labor organization.”); ALA. CODE § 25-7-32 (2012) (“No person shall be required by an employer to 
become or remain a member of any labor union or labor organization as a condition of employment or 
continuation of employment.”); O.C.G.A. § 34-6-23 (2012) (“Any provision in a contract between an 
employer and a labor organization which requires as a condition of employment or continuance of 
employment that any individual be or remain a member or an affiliate of a labor organization or that any 
individual pay any fee, assessment, or other sum of money whatsoever to a labor organization is declared 
to be contrary to the public policy of this state; and any such provision in any such contract heretofore or 
hereafter made shall be absolutely void.”). 
 135. Brudney, supra note 33, at 848–49. 
 136. Id. at 848. 
 137. Id. at 848–49. 
 138. Id. at 859–60. 
 139. Id. at 856. 
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of those soliciting employee signatures include (1) misrepresentation, 
(2) coercion, and (3) improper promises of benefits.140 However, “[i]n 
the end, there is no evidence of widespread or systemic misconduct 
associated with card signatures, and no reason to believe that existing 
instances of misconduct are not being adequately addressed through 
case-specific review of alleged abuses.” 141  As a result, adequate 
remedies exist through unfair labor practice proceedings for such 
alleged violations, and courts have been careful to ensure employees’ 
free choice has been preserved. 
B.   The Overriding Favorable Policy Consideration: Retaining 
Employer and Union Autonomy to Negotiate Union Organization and 
to Respect More Clearly-Established Outer Limits 
The landscape of labor law has changed dramatically over the past 
fifty years. Specifically, campaigns under neutrality agreements have 
largely replaced NLRB elections as the preferred method of union 
organizing and employer recognition of unions.142 This trend is “part 
of a larger commitment on the part of unions to modify the NLRB 
election-based approach to organizing.”143 Studies have found that, on 
the whole, unions enjoy a much higher rate of success in campaigns in 
which neutrality and card check are utilized.144 Undoubtedly, union 
management has become more sophisticated in negotiating contractual 
provisions in organizing agreements to increase the effectiveness of 
                                                                                                                 
 140. Id. at 860 (“Those soliciting employees’ signatures may provide inaccurate information as to the 
content or import of the cards, they may exert considerable pressure on employees to sign, or they may 
promise benefits as an inducement for signatures.”). 
 141. Brudney, supra note 33, at 862 (“When combined with the history of reliance on cards in a range 
of settings—including when conditions for a fair election exist—and the strong policy favoring voluntary 
labor-management agreements in general, it seems clear that employers’ willingness to recognize unions 
based on a card majority does not raise any serious problem of legality under the NLRA.”). 
 142. See id. at 827 (“[A]s union organizing activity has increased, the annual number of Board 
representation elections has reached its lowest level since the 1940s.”). More recently, in the six-year 
period from 1998 to 2003, less than one-fifth of newly organized employees did so under the “formerly 
pre-eminent Board elections process.” Id. at 828–29 (emphasis omitted). 
 143. Id. at 828. 
 144. Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 40, at 51–52 (noting that in a study of organizing campaigns from 
1983 to 1998, those conducted under neutrality and card check enjoyed a success rate of 78.2%, far 
exceeding the 45.6% success rate of NLRB elections). 
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organizing campaigns. 145  Employer neutrality goes a long way to 
increase the success of an organizing campaign by removing the 
potential detrimental effects of outward opposition. 146  For such a 
concession, it stands to bear that employers should enjoy a similar, 
albeit limited, position to bargain at arm’s length. 
In Mulhall, the union agreed to lend financial support to a ballot 
initiative pertaining to casino gaming.147 This specific fact is important 
because, on the whole, the concession the union made had nothing to 
do with individual employees’ substantive rights. Rather, the parties 
chose to put into practice commonly-used and historically-upheld 
provisions to make the process run more smoothly.148 In other words, 
“setting the ground rules” hardly suggests improper motives on the 
employer and union’s parts, which would more severely implicate 
Section 302. 
Rather, more substantive provisions (capable of financial valuation) 
in neutrality agreements should be subject to factual consideration and 
scrutiny under Section 302 of LMRA. A more proper class of 
provisions for the purposes of a Section 302 analysis would be those 
that govern important employment terms and that are normally 
reserved for later-finalized collective bargaining agreements, where 
employees maintain more time and a higher interest in what those 
provisions say. Subjecting these types of provisions to a Section 302 
analysis would ensure that the union’s duties to employees would not 
be undercut and that individual employees’ rights would not be 
compromised. 
                                                                                                                 
 145. Brudney, supra note 33, at 854. 
 146. Lalas, supra note 11, at 544–45 (discussing how neutrality agreements “allow[] workers to 
consider unionizing in relative comfort and security” and “help[] protect employees’ ability to choose a 
union by removing the fear out of the organizing drive”). To these points, Lalas also points out that 
neutrality agreements can quicken the time before an election is held. Id. at 545. In a Board election, 
workers have to wait two months to vote, during which time management mounts a “visceral campaign 
to turn workers against the union using a variety of fear-inducing tactics.” Id. However, under a neutrality 
agreement, workers are sometimes able to participate in an election in a much shorter time, such as a few 
weeks. Id. 
 147. Mulhall v. Unite Here Local 355, 667 F.3d 1211, 1213 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. dismissed, 134 S. 
Ct. 594, and cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 822 (2013). 
 148. Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
When employers and unions decide collectively to enter into a 
neutrality agreement to govern the organizing process, both parties 
have fundamental interests they seek to protect. These interests are so 
important that they make foregoing an NLRB election a calculated, 
worthwhile decision. Unions ultimately want their campaign to 
succeed, as it provides them the opportunity to do what they do best—
bargain with management and represent employees. Employers have 
fundamental interests that they seek to protect as well—namely, their 
freedoms of speech (to speak or not to), to contract (or not to), and to 
exercise their property rights in a way in which they see fit. 
This Note proposes that resolving the circuit split in favor of not 
categorically classifying certain organizing assistance provisions in 
neutrality agreements better serves existing practices that employers 
and unions undertake at the organizing phase of unionization. As 
discussed, doing so does not run contrary to the LMRA’s language or 
Congress’s intent in enacting and amending it. Moreover, this 
resolution does not necessarily implicate negative policy implications 
in practice as much as it does in theory. Under such a construction, 
employers, unions, and employees alike retain fundamental rights. 
They do so in a context that promotes a union organization process that 
is less contentious and allows for employers and unions to realize an 
accord that will hopefully, in the long run, make their relationship 
more stable. 
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